I have just started Amartya Sen’s new book "The Idea of Justice" which in many ways is the culmination of his heterodox approach to the problems of economics and political philosophy. Sen’s approach is to start not from perfect ideals, but from comparative analysis to derive capabilities. His belief is that ‘perfect’ models blind us to what can be achieved in the real world – the life I can lead – by focusing on creating idealistic contexts which must artificially separate themselves from the social and political realities of the individual human agents who enact them. His is also a valid criticism of thinking about ‘money’ which is too often focused around some idea of "perfect money" or the ‘idea’ of money. A one time student and collaborator with Rawls, Sen is seeking to develop a new approach to engage with the problems and injustices of modern societies without resort to abstract 'perfect institutions. In fact, many economists would find Rawls' "original condition" and "thin conception of the good" familiar in the way it defines human actors in minimal form to enable analysis of a hypothetical social contract free from contemporary baggage. Perhaps it is not the idea of the hypothetical contract which is the issue, but rather Rawls’ focus on human actors in the performance of justice. Rawls appears to privilege the subjective as providing the ultimate ‘objective’ view of what justice is. The problem with this approach is that at some point he must introduce additional ‘actors’ and ‘things’ into the situation to avoid his world becoming an entirely ‘alien’ or solipsist proposition without meaning in our cultural and linguistic context. As a result, his global hypothesis becomes contaminated with very ‘local’ concerns (geographically and temporally speaking) and shifts from a hypothetical state to a virtual one (an imagining of the real as opposed to some purely rational ideal) which borders on and even overlaps with the ‘real’. Rawls later conceded that his theories were designed to make explicit and coherent the principles of justice in democratic, culturally pluralist states and appeared to move away from some of the universalist implications of his magnum opus. Sen takes that a stage further by making the context the start point for understanding how I can live the good life rather than an abstraction of what the good life is. Certainly I can see real value in examining money both using a comparative approach to generate capabilities rather than some universal ideal. To liberate money from the subjective is the first stage in de-mystifying its meaning and practice in everyday life. The separation of particular forms of money from the context in which it is being used removes the very meaning that drives its usage. Sen’s hypothesis is that once this is recognized, we are freed from the pursuit of ideal institutions and instead see them as tools for the resolution of particular social injustices and problems. By transforming (e)Utopia (the good place) into Eudaimonia (living well) we look for solutions in terms of individual capabilities rather than through the imposition of institutional frameworks or solutions. As we found in last week, this approach forces us to challenge our assumptions about how particular segments of our society use and experience money and how that use and experience changes their perception of its meaning and value to them. Hence ‘living without money’ has very different cultural interpretations depending on your perspective and any intervention involving money needs to take account of both the constraints and capabilities generated by those perspectives.